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Recent Developments 
Johnson v. State: 
An Inchoate Crime Sentence Shall Not Exceed the Maximum Sentence, 
Without Enhancements, of the Target Crime 
The Court of Appeals of Mary land held that life 
imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole is not a legal 
sentence for conspiracy to commit 
murder. Johnson v. State, 2001 
Md. LEXIS 18 (2001). The 
court's ruling clarified that death 
or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole are 
"enhanced" sentences for first 
degree murder, and thus are 
dependant upon special 
circumstances. !d. at 6. 
Accordingly, when a sentencing 
provision provides that the 
punishment for an inchoate crime 
shall not exceed the maximum 
punishment provided for the target 
crime, the provision only 
contemplates the basic maximum 
sentence available for the target 
crime and does not incorporate 
the enhanced penalty provisions. 
!d. at 11. 
On November 10, 1997, 
Judy Forrester, a disabled 
woman, was found in her home 
bound with duct tape and fatally 
shot. Rondell Johnson 
("Johnson") was convicted of 
murder, robbery, conspiracy to 
commit those crimes, and other 
offenses. 
Johnson was found guilty in 
the Circuit Court for Prince 
George's County of first-degree 
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premeditated murder, robbery 
with a deadly weapon, first-
degree burglary, use of a handgun 
in the commission of a felony or 
crime of violence, conspiracy to 
commit murder, and conspiracy to 
commit robbery. Johnson was 
sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole 
for the first-degree premeditated 
murder conviction and a 
consecutive sentence of life 
without parole for the conspiracy 
to commit murder. On appeal, the 
court of special appeals affirmed 
Johnson's sentence. The court of 
appeals granted Johnson's 
petition for a writ of certiorari to 
determine whether life without 
parole is a legal sentence for the 
crime of conspiracy to commit 
murder. 
First, the court examined 
Maryland case law interpreting 
Maryland Code ( 1957, 1996 
Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 38 and§ 
412(b). !d. at 4. Section 38 
mandates the punishment for 
conspiracy and provides that the 
punishment cannot exceed the 
maximum punishment provided 
for the substantive offense. !d. In 
addition, § 412(b) provides that 
the punishment for first-degree 
murder "shall be imprisonment for 
life" unless the State seeks death 
or life without parole. /d. at 5. 
The State must meet other special 
conditions for death, or life 
without parole. !d. at 5. 
Second, the court reviewed 
Sucik v. State, which held that 
"death and life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole 
are enhanced sentences for first-
degree murder, and are 
dependent upon special 
circumstances," and because an 
enhanced punishment is "highly 
penal," it has to be strictly 
construed. !d. at 7 (citing Sucik 
v. State, 344 Md. 611, 616-617, 
689 A.2d 78, 80 ( 1997)). The 
court remarked "conspiracy" is a 
common-law inchoate offense for 
which the General Assembly 
limited , by statute, the 
punishment to the maximum 
sentence of the substantive crime. 
/d. at 8. The court also observed 
that Maryland precedent 
recognizes that this limitation on 
the conspiracy sentence, in 
reference to the maximum 
sentence of the substantive or 
target offense, means the "basic 
maximum sentence of the target 
offense and does not include any 
enhanced penalty provisions" for 
such an offense. /d. The United 
States Supreme Court has taken 
the same position in construing a 
federal statute providing that the 
sentence for attempt or 
conspiracy "may not exceed the 
punishment prescribed for the 
offense which was the object of 
the attempt or the conspiracy." /d. 
Next, the court reviewed 
Deleon v. State, in which the 
same sentencing issue was 
involved but with a different target 
crime. /d. at 11 (citing Deleon 
v. State, 102 Md. App. 58, 72, 
648 A.2d 1053, 1059 (1968)). In 
Deleon, the court held that when 
a sentencing provision states that 
the punishment for an inchoate 
crime shall not exceed the 
maximum punishment provided 
for the target crime, the provision 
only contemplates the basic 
maximum sentence available for 
the target crime and does not 
incorporate the enhanced penalty 
provisions. /d. Moreover, in 
support of its holding, the Deleon 
court pointed out, "that parole was 
not an inherent part of the judicial 
sentencing function and that, 
except m those limited 
circumstances when the 
Legislature has expressly 
empowered the courts to impose 
no-parole provisions under 
certain very specifically designed 
circumstances, the parole function 
is exclusively within the control of 
the executive branch of 
government." /d. at 12. Deleon 
further pointed out that the 
Legislature made provisions for 
enhanced penalties for some 
particular types of conspiracies 
and if they wanted to "specifically 
[] provide enhanced penalties for 
... conspirators, it knows how to 
do so expressly and does not rely 
on implication." /d. at 13 (citing 
Deleon, 102 Md. App. at 86, 
648 A.2d at 1066-1067). The 
court held that life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole is 
not a legal sentence for conspiracy 
to commit murder. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the court of 
special appeals was reversed. /d. 
at 17. 
Johnson v. State clarifies 
the statutory sentencing provisions 
for inchoate offenses in Maryland. 
This holding illustrates that the 
Maryland Legislature did not 
intend to allow trial judges to use 
their discretion to enhance the 
sentencing penalties of inchoate 
crimes. With this holding, the 
court informs trial judges that 
"enhanced" sentence provisions 
are "sentencing options" available 
for special cases and special 
defendants and are not intended 
to apply to inchoate crimes ofthe 
target offense. 
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